In a DAO Democracy, how do we propose a bill, and how does it get adopted? Initially, anyone can propose a bill. It can be submitted at any time. If the prediction market says it has a positive impact on the collective welfare, it is adopted. If not, it is not. If the bill is […]
If we grant that the final result is desirable, how might it be achieved? What are the paths from the world as it exists today to this future, better world where sound governance is the rule and not the exception? An existing organization might already be taking an annual poll of its members, and if […]
Anyone can propose a bill at any time. All proposals are reviewed equally, without bias. Proposals that improve the general welfare (according to the prediction market’s evaluation of the publicly known metric for the general welfare) will be adopted. The mechanism by which bills are reviewed is open to all. Anyone can investigate and present […]
While we have considered DAO’s as a base for a stable democracy, it is apparent that they can serve as a base for any computation. Further, given the persistence of a successful DAO (the DAO for Bitcoin has persisted since January 3rd, 2009), it seems inevitable that Darwinian selection will be applied quite vigorously to […]
A problem that might occur with prediction markets and governmental policies might be described as the End of the World problem. Suppose we are evaluating a policy that is very good, but has the small problem that is has a 20% probability of causing the end of the world. Normally, if a prediction market is […]
Most democracies have an Executive Officer, such as the President of the United States, typically elected either directly or indirectly by the people. In a DAO Democracy, assuming we retain the Executive Branch in more or less its current form, the simplest approach would be to appoint, as President, that person the prediction market said […]
Another problem with evaluating collective welfare is membership in the collective: who do we add and who do we remove? We consider criteria that are suitable for membership in a nation (in contrast with membership in the local chess club, or a student in a school, or a shareholder in a company). Traditionally, for democracies, children of […]
We now give an example of how to buy and sell DCWi in a prediction market. First, a trader purchases a pair of conditional bearer bonds from a bank for $1 in the year 2016. The first says “Pay to bearer $1 times DCW2016” The second says “Pay to bearer $1 times (1-DCW2016)”. Because DCW2016 is between […]
– Ralph Merkle State of Satisfaction. Annually, all citizens are asked to rank the year just passed between 0 and 1 (inclusive). If you wish, you can think of this as a poll of each citizen’s individual welfare, where 0 means the welfare of the citizen that year was the worst possible, and 1 is the […]
– Ralph Merkle Futarchy, proposed by Robin Hanson, is a proposal to govern by prediction markets. The proposal seems like an excellent approach for improving upon existing democratic forms of governance. The general concept: To aggregate knowledge from across a community of people, using a method that’s known to be effective: prediction markets. Use that […]
Social Liberty